The Regional Effects of European Integration - an Empirical Analysis of Three Enlargement Episodes by Peter Huber
An Empirical Analysis of the Regional Effects 
of European Integration  
Peter Huber  
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) 





AbstractThis paper analyses the effects of three previous enlargements of the European 
Union on newly joining and old member states. We find that overall the effects of 
enlargements  on  regional  employment,  wage  and  population  growth,  as  well  as 
investment rates were small. We also find substantial heterogeneity between different 
accession episodes, stronger effects on wages than on employment and differences in 
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Introduction 
In  the  public  debate  the  net  effects  of  integration  on  the  regional  distribution  of 
economic activity remain disputed. This applies in particular to border regions. On the 
one hand, concerns are often voiced about potential negative wage and employment 
effects due to increased competitive pressures as well as capital and labour mobility. On 
the  other  hand,  it  has  been  repeatedly  argued  that  integration  alleviates  the 
disadvantages  of  limited  market  access  in  border  regions  and  should  thus  have 
particularly favourable effects on these regions.  
Recent economic theories analysing the effects of integration on regional economies 
provide some basis for both arguments. Starting from the assumption that the economic 
geography  of  a  country  is  shaped  by  centripedal  and  centrifugal  forces,  where 
centripedal forces may arise from the interaction of (internal or external) economies of 
scale and the aim of producers to economize on transport costs, while centrifugal forces 
arise  from  increasing  costs  of  immobile  factors  in  central  locations,  non-pecuniary 
negative  externalities  and/or  higher  competition  and  thus  lower  mark-ups  among 
producers in  the centre, these "new economic geography models" (see: Fujita  et al, 
1999) suggest that integration and trade liberalisation have two coutervailing effects on 
regional economies.  
On  the  one  hand,  as  cross  border  transport  costs  fall,  –  which  is  a  synonym  for 
integration in these models, – market access to regions across the border improves. As a 
consequence of this "market access effect" (see: Otaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2004), 
incentives to locate production in regions remote from the country's centre increase –  2  – 
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even when regions are equidistant from the border. The reason for this is that as the 
foreign market becomes more accessible it becomes less important to locate near home 
market demand centres, and more attractive to serve the foreign market from a location, 
such  as  the  periphery,  with  lower  prices  for  immobile  factors.  In  consequence 
employment, productivity and wage  growth should increase in regions further away 
from  a  countries  centre  after  integration  and  factor  flows  (i.e.  investments  and 
migration) to these regions should increase relative to the period before integration.1  
On the other hand, due to the fall in transport costs, competition from producers across 
the border will also increase. When regions are equidistant from the border this "market 
crowding" effect will ceteris paribus create incentives for firms to relocate to central 
locations in order to exploit productivity enhancing externalities in the centre. Thus 
increased  concentration  of  economic  activity  (i.e.  lower  employment,  wage  and 
productivity  growth  as  well  as  lower  factor  fows  relative  to  the  situation  before 
integration) may be a consequence of integration.2  
These issues become more involved when regions are not equidistant from the national 
border and thus may (as in the case of border regions) attain an advantage of market 
access to the foreign market relative to other regions as a consequence of integration. 
                                                       
1 Krugman and Livas (1992) and Fujita et al, (1999, Chapter 18) formalize this "market access effect" by 
assuming that the centrifugal force arises from the immobility of land. In their model a reduction in cross 
border transport unambiguoulsy increases incentives for firms to locate far from the county's centre. 
2 Paluzzie (2002) and Monfort and Nicolini (2000) present models, which incorporate both effects. In 
these the effect of integration on location is ambiguous but centralisation is predicted for a wide range of 
parameters. –  3  – 
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Recently,  Crozet  and  Koenig-Souberain  (2002  and  2004)  and  Bruelhart,  Crozet, 
Koenig, (2004) present a model which treats this additional complication. The results 
indicate that for a large set of parameters the market access effect will dominate. This 
tendency may, however, be broken if the advantages of increased market access are 
small relative to the costs of increased competition from abroad, which may be the case 
when the market potential that can be reached from the external border region is small 
relative to the internal market potential, or if cost advantages of the border regions 
relative to the countries centre in accessing the foreign market is small (i.e. countries are 
small)  or  if  the  pre-existing  centres  in  the  countries  are  large  in  terms  of  relative 
demand. 
Thus the central predictions of new economic geography models concerning the impact 
of integration on the regional structure of production are that depending on the relative 
strength of market access and market crowding effects, integration may lead to either 
increased concentration and a shift of production away from the border, or to increased 
decentralisation of production and a shift of production towards border regions.  
Which  of  these  tendencies  prevails  is  an  empirical  issue.  In  consequence  empirical 
estimates  of  regional  integration  effects  are  an  important  aspect  of  determinig  the 
relvance of these theories. Despite this insight, evidence on the effects of integration on 
border regions is rare.3 Among the exceptions Hanson (1996, 1998) uses the example of 
                                                       
3 Research concentrated on measuring border effects, on case studies of individual border regions, while 
there is little comparative work of regions in a country (see van Houtem, 2000 and Niebuhr and Stiller 
2002 for surveys). –  4  – 
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Mexico, to show that after trade liberalisation wages and employment increased more 
rapidly in Mexican regions closer to the border of the US. Hanson's analysis, however, 
concentrates on a particular case of integration of a developing country with one of the 
most  highly  developed  countries  in  the  world.  Thus  there  is  a  need  for  testing  the 
generality of these results in different institutional contexts. This has only been done in 
few  cases only and  results often contradict  Hanson's. Hanson  (1998a) reports much 
weaker effects of integration for Canada and the United States, Barjak and Heimpold 
(1999), Heimpold (2004) and Engel (1999) focus on investments and firm start-ups in 
the Polish – German border region and find no or only weak evidence of integration 
effects. Mayerhofer (2004) and Huber (2004) look at the effects of opening of Eastern 
Europe  on  Austrian  border  regions  and  find  some  evidence  for  small  positive 
integration effects on employment growth, job creation and GDP per capita, but most 
other indicators used in these studies show no positive impact of integration. Finally, 
Büttner and Rincke (2005) find that German – German integration had negative effects 
on West German border regions.  
In this paper we extend this literature to an analysis of the effects of EU integration on 
regional development both for existing as well as newly joining EU member states. This 
is important not only because it delivers additional insights on the generality of previous 
results, but also because with the enlargment of the European Union by 10 countries in 
May 2004 issues of the regional effects of integration have recieved renewed interest in 
the policy arena. The analysis of previous enlargments could help shape expectations in 
this debate. –  5  – 
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Data  
We use annual Eurostat regional data at the NUTS II level provided to us by Cambridge 
Econometrics reaching from 1975 to 2000. These data allow us to assess the regional 
impact  of  European  integration  on  NUTS  II  level  employment,  productivity, 
investments,  as  well  as  on  wage  and  population  growth  for  both  existing  and  new 
member states, for three episodes of enlargement: Enlargement by Greece, in 1981, 
Southern Enlargement (by Spain and Portugal) in 1986 and Northern Enlargement (by 
Austria, Finland and Sweden) in 1995. We arrange this data so as to consider the 5 
years before and 7 years after accession. Furthermore, for both Southern and Northern 
Enlargement we also focus on effects of integration on nearby member states. In the 
case of Southern Enlargement we choose France4 as a neighbouring member state and 
in the case of Northern enlargement these are Denmark and Italy.5 
These cases provide substantial variance with respect to the institutional circumstances 
of  integration,  the  size,  geographic  structure  and  level  of  development  of  both  the 
integrating countries as well as the nearby old member states.6 In particular later entries 
                                                       
4 We exclude French obverseas territories from the analysis. 
5 We do not include Germany because of lacking data for some indicators and because German – German 
integration in the 1990's may cause Germany to be a special case. 
6 The cases also differ from the US-Mexico case analysed by Hanson (1996, 1998). In contrast to this, 
European integration allowed for increased cross border labour mobility and new member states were 
often small, developed countries.  –  6  – 
     6 
joined a successively more integrated European Union.7 While this would suggest more 
sizeable effects of integration in later accessions, Northern Enlargement also differs 
from previous enlargements in that the countries joining the European Union in 1995 
were  already  members  of  the  European  Economic  Area  since  1991,  so  that  these 
countries not only joined a more deeply integrated Union, but were also more deeply 
integrated into the Union before accession. This suggests that effects of integration may 
have been smaller. 
Furthermore, in the case of Southern Enlargement derogation periods on the freedom of 
movement of labour were negotiated.  By contrast for Northern Enlargement no such 
derogation periods were needed. This may have implications on results because as noted 
by Büttner and Rincke (2004), if cross – border migration is allowed benefits from 
integration could potentially conentrate on only one side of the border. 
Finally,  these  integration  cases  also  included  countries  of  very  different  levels  of 
development and sizes (see table 1). Enlargement by Greece and Southern Enlargement 
included  poorer  countries  (per  capita  GDP  of  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  ranged 
between 50% and 75% of the EU average when they joined the Union), while Northern 
Enlargement included richer countries (Austrian and Swedish per capita GDP levels 
exceeding the Unions average and Finland approached this level). This implies that the 
market  potential  of  the  European  Union  was  larger  relative  to  the  domestic  market 
potential  in  Southern  Enlargment  and  Enlargement  by  Greece  than  in  Northern 
                                                       
7 Greece joined before the completion of the single European Act. Spain and Portugal joined in the year 
of the single European Act, and Northern Enlargement occured after treaty of Amsterdam was signed.  –  7  – 
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Enlargement. As shown in column 2 of table 1 the additional market potential becoming 
accessible through integration remained small for the old  member states and  varied 
substantially for acceding countries. This would lead one to expect to find larger effects 
in the first two enlargement rounds.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of analysed Countries 
 
Per capita GDP in % of EU 
average at accession 
Total GDP of the EU in percent of 
the GDP of the joining country1) 
Area in 
thousand km2 
Southern Enlargement       
Spain  69.00  1093.29  504.8 
Portugal  54.00  6381.04  90.9 
Greece  75.00  4109.97  131.6 
Northern Enlargement       
Austria  113.00  2827.06  83.9 
Sweden  101.00  2565.95  410.9 
Finland  91.00  5186.92  304.5 
       
France*  111.00  10.71  544.0 
Italy**  115.00  3.54  301.3 
Denmark  114.00  5.83  43.1 
Notes 1) For France, Italy and Denmark this column displays the total GDP of the newly joining countries in 
percent of the GDP of the nearby ol member state country, Source: Eurostat 
Similar observations apply to the potential cost advantages of locating nearer to the 
border. Many of the acceding countries analysed in this paper were small in terms of 
area. Thus one would expect relatively low effects on border regions. Furthermore, in 
the case of Greece a country was integrated, which is distant from the EU and shares no 
common land border with the EU, this would also suggest that the market access effect 
in this integration was limited. 
Due to this heterogeneity we do not pool data across countries, but analyse each case 
separately  by  focusing  on  five  variables:  employment  growth,  productivity  growth, 
wage growth, investments and immigration. We measure employment growth as the 
change of the log of average annual employment, wage growth as the change in average 
log  compensation  per  employee  in  a  region,  and  investment  rates  as  investment –  8  – 
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expenditure in % of gross value added. Furthermore as a proxy for migration we use 
population  growth  as  the  log  change  in  working  age  population  in  a  region.8  The 
structure of these data differ somewhat for some of these indicators. For employment 
and productivity growth we have available indicators for each region for a total of 14 
industries,  while  for  population,  investments  and  wages,  we  only  have  available 
regional averages across all sectors.9 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistcs for dependent Variables 











Greece  Before   5  0.0195  0.0622  -1.4617  0.2227  0.0016 
    (13)  (0.0586)  (0.1026)  (0.0824)  (0.0311)  (0.0176) 
  After  7  -0.0018  0.0143  -1.7096  0.1948  0.0103 
    (13)  (0.1568)  (0.1962)  (0.1010)  (0.0523)  (0.0064) 
Southern Enlargement  Before   5  -0.0086  0.0049  -1.7195  0.0685  0.0092 
    (25)  (0.0882)  (0.1540)  (0.5360)  (0.0670)  (0.0097) 
  After  7  0.0147  0.0178  -1.5587  0.0945  0.0053 
    (25)  (0.1484)  (0.1714)  (0.4717)  (0.0627)  (0.0213) 
Northern Enlargement   Before   5  -0.0027  0.0218  -1.5953  0.0272  0.0051 
    (23)  (0.0603)  (0.1039)  (0.1664)  (0.0648)  (0.0062) 
  After  7  0.0023  0.0219  -1.5812  0.0305  0.0028 
    (23)  (0.0484)  (0.0675)  (0.1189)  (0.0374)  (0.0069) 
France  Before   5  -0.0003  0.0236  -1.6392  0.0690  0.0112 
    (22)  (0.0433)  (0.0709)  (0.0417)  (0.0286)  (0.0033) 
  After  7  -0.0020  0.0201  -1.5628  0.0532  0.0035 
    (22)  (0.0353)  (0.0861)  (0.0465)  (0.0176)  (0.0037) 
Italy and Denmark  Before   5  -0.0011  0.0257  -1.6018  0.0507  0.0023 
    (23)  (0.0694)  (0.1230)  (0.0715)  (0.0420)  (0.0044) 
  After  7  0.0047  0.0160  -1.5518  0.0463  0.0003 
    (23)  (0.0362)  (0.0587)  (0.0720)  (0.0495)  (0.0082) 
Note: Table displays unweighted means across regions, values in brackets are standard deviations. 1) first 
line states number of time periods (T) second line states the number of regions (N). For employment and 
productivity growth there are observations on 14 sectors per region. 2) looged investments relative to 
GDP 3) Varaibles are measured in log differences. Excluding French overseas territories. 
                                                       
8)  We  use  first  differences  since  prior  testing  suggests  variables  in  levels  are  integrated  but  first 
differences are not, and because differencing removes any effects on the indicators arising from region 
fixed effects such as may be due to amenities or abundance of natural ressources. 
9) Aggriculture is ommitted from the analysis, since it is not considered a mobile sector. –  9  – 
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Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  for  the  indicators  used  and  devides  the 
observation period into a period before and after EU accession. This table suggests that 
integration did not significantly change aggregate economic growth within countries. 
Performing tests for the equality of means in the two periods, we cannot reject the null 
of equal employment, wage, population and productivity growth as well as investment 
rates before and after accession for any of the accessions analysed. Furthermore, the 
table also  suggests  substantial variance in  the  regional growth  and investment rates 
among regions both before as well as after integration. 
Empirical Framework  
The central concern of this paper is with this regional variance. We want to see whether, 
integration either had an effect on regions nearer to the border or led to decentralisation 
of production in the newly joining as well as the nearby old member states. This would 
be  the  case  if  border  regions  or  regions  more  distant  from  the  country  centre 
experienced  higher  employment,  productivity  and  wage  growth  as  well  as  higher 
investments  and  immigration,  relative  to  other  regions  in  the  time  period  after 
integration. We thus follow Hanson (1998) and estimate regressions of the form:  
it it i t i t i i it Z DC AC DB AC DC DB Y z l g g b b a + + + + + + = * * * * * * 2 1 2 1      (1) 
for each accession analysed. In this regression Yit is an indicator measuring factor flows 
or economic activity in a region, DBi is the (log) distance to Brussels, DCi the (log) 
distance to the countries capital, where both are measured as the crows fly distance to 
the respective NUTSII regions's capital, ACt is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value 1 if the year under consideration lies after the accession of the respective country. –  10  – 
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Zit  is  a  vector  of  potential  further  explanatory  variables,  which  in  our  baseline 
specification are  a  family  of  industry  as  well  as  industry  -time  fixed effects  where 
applicable.10  
For  the  neighbouring  countries  (i.e.  France,  Italy,  Denmark)  considered  we  run 
analogous  regressions,  where  DBi  is  the  distance  to  the  capital  of  the  nearby  new 
member states (i.e. to Madrid for France, to Vienna for Italy and to Stockholm for 
Denmark) and all other variables are defined equivalently to above. 
In  equation  (1)  a  necessary  condition  for  signficant  integration  effects  is  that  the 
parameters g1 and g2 differ significantly from zero. If g1 is positive, regions further away 
from  Brussels  (or  the  acceding  country's  capital)  experienced  an  increase  in 
employment wage, productivity and population growth or investment rates relative to 
regions closer to the border. This would indicate that reallocation took place away from 
border regions. If by contrast the coefficient is negative, this implies that border regions 
experienced a better development. If g2 is significantly negative this would indicate, that 
integration resulted in a decentralisation of production away from the countries centre, 
while in the opposite case centralisation would be indicated. 
There are a number of methodological problems that may be expected to arise in the 
context of a regression such as shown in equation (1). First, shocks to one region or 
industry  may  have  effects  on  other  regions  or  industries,  which  would  imply  cross 
                                                       
10 The inclusion of region effects is precluded because the distance variables are time invariant. We also 
experimented  with  the  inclusion  of  region-sector  dummy  variables.  These  proofed  to  be  jointly 
insignificant. Thus they were excluded to avoid overparametrisation. –  11  – 
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sectional  dependence  in  the  error  terms.  Second,  some  of  the  variables  in  our 
regressions are measured at different levels of aggregation, this applies in particular to 
all  regressions  where  industry-region  information  is  utilized.  In  these  distance  is 
measured at the regional level only. As pointed out amongst others by Blien (1996) this 
will induce  some cross sectional dependence in error  terms  by definition. Third, as 
recently  shown  by  Bertrand,  Duflo  and  Mullainathan  (2004)  in  the  context  of 
difference-in-difference estimates, equation (1) may yield autocorrelation in error terms. 
In  consequence  we  estimate  variance–covariance  matrices  which  are  robust  to  both 
serial as well as spatial autocorrelation by applying the method proposed by Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998).11 
A further complication arises from the fact that significance of estimated coefficients in 
the regression represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration to have 
had an effect of the regional structure of production. This paired with the substantial 
uncertainty  concerning  the  time  period  within  which  the integration  effects  may  be 
identified12 makes it difficult to establish causality in the specified regression. Again 
this point has been made in the literature on difference in difference estmation (see 
                                                       
11) This is an extension of the variance-covariance estimator developed in Newey and West (1987) which 
is consistent irrespective of the form of cross-sectional dependence provided of the autocorrelation of the 
error term gets smaller at longer lags. It requires that the lag length for the residuals be determined ex 
ante. We use a lag length of one in all results below although results are robust to increasing this to two. 
Dricoll and Kray (1998) present simulations, which yield reliable results for data of the size we use.  
12) It has for instance been argued (see Boeri and Brücker, 2001) that the effects of integration may have 
been felt prior to enlargement as economic actors foresaw the development.  –  12  – 
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Angrist and Krueger, 1999). We tackle this problem by extensively checking on the 
robustness of our results. In our baseline specification we focus on a period of 5 years 
before integration and 7 years after and estimate both equation (1) and an additional 
specification, in which we interact distance to the border and distance to the capital city 
with year dummies to analyse to what degree there is a robust relationship between the 
estimated  coefficients.  Furthermore,  we  also  extend  the  regression  results  to  the 
complete observation horizon available to us (i.e. 1975 to 2000) 
Results 
Table 3 presents results concerning the regional effects of integration on employment 
growth in both acceding countries as well as nearby old member states. The top panel 
(entitled total employment growth) presents results when estimating equation (1) for all 
sectors. We find only very weak evidence to support the view that European integration 
had  any  effect  on  the  regional  distribution  of  employment  growth  in  the  acceeding 
countries. The interaction of the dummy variable for the time period after accession and 
distance to Brussels is negative (thus indicating more rapid growth in regions closer to 
the  border),  but  remains  insignificant  for  all  cases  studies.  The  evidence  on  the 
concentration of production by contrast suggests significantly higher concentration was 
a  result  of  integration  in  the  case  of  Southern  Enlargement  only,  while  all  other 
coefficients also remain insingifcant. 
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Total Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0222***  -0.0036***  -0.0085  0.0017  2184 
  (0.0034)  (0.0005)  (0.0066)  (0.0015)  (0.592) 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0196  0.0024**  4200 
  (0.0069)  (0.0007)  (0.0205)  (0.0012)  (0.142) 
Northern Enlargement   0.0019  0.0008  -0.0045  -0.0007  3864 
  (0.0067)  (0.0007)  (0.0072)  (0.0008)  (0.238) 
           
France  -0.0009  -0.0001  0.0025  -0.0003  3696 
  (0.0006)  (0.0010)  (0.0040)  (0.0012)  (0.354) 
Italy and Denmark  0.0013  0.0001  -0.0020  0.0001  3864 
  (0.0020)  (0.0003)  (0.0031)  (0.0004)  (0.164) 
Manufacturing Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0218***  -0.0030***  -0.0144  0.0027  1248 
  (0.0042)  (0.0006)  (0.0105)  (0.0024)  (0.578) 
Southern Enlargement  0.0035  -0.0010  -0.0168  0.0023**  2400 
  (0.0098)  (0.0011)  (0.0271)  (0.0012)  (0.107) 
Notrhern Enlargement   -0.0041  0.0017  -0.0031  -0.0013  2208 
  (0.0112)  (0.0017)  (0.0116)  (0.0017)  (0.203) 
           
France  -0.0006  -0.0004  0.0024  -0.0008  2112 
  (0.0018)  (0.0019)  (0.0077)  (0.0022)  (0.278) 
Italy and Denmark  0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0011  0.0006  2484 
  (0.0027)  (0.0005)  (0.0047)  (0.0007)  (0.141) 
Service Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0229***  -0.0044***  -0.0006  0.0003  936 
  (0.0059)  (0.0008)  (0.0062)  (0.0010)  (0.571) 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0052  0.0000  -0.0232  0.0025  1800 
  (0.0084)  (0.0003)  (0.0237)  (0.0020)  (0.195) 
Northern Enlargement  0.0099***  -0.0003  -0.0065**  0.0001  1656 
  (0.0014)  (0.0013)  (0.0035)  (0.0013)  (0.229) 
           
France  -0.0013  0.0013  0.0021  -0.0012***  1584 
  (0.0017)  (0.0002)  (0.0035)  (0.0003)  (0.509) 
Italy and Denmark  0.0025  0.0005  -0.0026  -0.0005  1656 
  (0.0038)  (0.0009)  (0.0038)  (0.0010)  (0.286) 
Note:  All  regression  include  sector  and  sector  –time    dummies.  Values  in  brackets  are  (heteroskedasticity  serial  and  spatial 
correlation robust) standard errors (see: Driscoll and Kray, 1998) *, **, *** signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For 
France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, For the nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance 
to Vienna, Denmark distance to Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country. Excluding French 
overseas territories 
This finding is reconfirmed both when focusing exclusively on manufacturing or service 
employment  growth.  Concerning  manufacturing  employment  growth  (in  the  second 
panel  of  table  3),  we  again  find  that  regions  nearer  to  Brussels  experienced  larger 
manufacturing employment growth in all acceeding countries and the existing member 
states except for France. This effect is, however, insignificant. Significant concentration –  14  – 
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can once more only be found for Southern Enlargement. For services (see panel 3 of 
table 3) the coefficient for the accession and distance to Brussels interaction as well as 
the distance to capital interaction is insignificant in most cases. The only exceptions are 
Northern Enlargement where service employment grew significantly more rapidly in 
regions closer to the border after integration and France where regions further away 
from the capital experienced more rapid service employment growth after integration.  
Figure 1: Coefficients of interaction terms between years and distance to Brusells and 
year and distance to capital in total employment growth regressions  






















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
France North Inc  












-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6








-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
France  Norther old Members  
Note: Figures displays coefficients of a regression as displayed in equation (1) but replacing Act*DBi variable 
with year * distance to capital as well as the Act*DCi variable with year * distance to brussels interaction 
dummy variables. 
Finally,  when  considering  the  results  of  year  by  year  regressions  (in  Figure  1)  no 
general  pattern  emerges.  Coefficients  of  total  employment  growth,  fluctuate 
substantially over time  periods,  are  insignificant and  comparable in  magintude  both 
before and after accessions –  15  – 
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Total Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182***  0.0122***  0.0137  -0.0078**  2184 
  0.0074  0.0028  0.0134  0.0036  0.475 
Southern Enlargement  0.0096  0.0002  0.0115  -0.0019  4200 
  0.0195  0.0007  0.0256  0.0025  0.235 
Northern Enlargement   -0.0039  -0.0001  0.0091  -0.0015**  3864 
  0.0063  0.0005  0.0065  0.0007  0.201 
           
France  -0.0055  -0.0003  0.0069  0.0008  3696 
  0.0068  0.0008  0.0082  0.0018  0.204 
North inc  -0.0025  0.0004  0.0003  -0.0012  3864 
  0.0014  0.0015  0.0029  0.0016  0.243 
Manufacturing Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182***  0.0084***  0.0020  0.0001  936 
  0.0055  0.0020  0.0080  0.0036  0.656 
Southern Enlargement  0.0100  0.0000  0.0085  -0.0023  1800 
  0.0080  0.0007  0.0227  0.0026  0.220 
Notrhern Enlargement   -0.0059  0.0011  0.0055  -0.0020  1656 
  0.0042  0.0014  0.0055  0.0015  0.172 
           
France  0.0014  0.0010  -0.0028  -0.0004  1584 
  0.0033  0.0014  0.0058  0.0023  0.485 
North inc  -0.0027  0.0003  0.0011  -0.0009  1656 
  0.0033  0.0007  0.0036  0.0009  0.317 
Service Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182***  0.0150***  0.0225  -0.0136***  1248 
  0.0108  0.0043  0.0234  0.0048  0.433 
Southern Enlargement  0.0093  0.0004  0.0138  -0.0015  2400 
  0.0338  0.0015  0.0399  0.0028  0.231 
Notrhern Enlargement  -0.0024  -0.0011  0.0118  -0.0011  2208 
  0.0088  0.0012  0.0091  0.0014  0.155 
           
France  -0.0108  -0.0014  0.0126  0.0016  2112 
  0.0157  0.0020  0.0173  0.0026  0.149 
Italy  -0.0012  0.0003  -0.0018  -0.0009  2484 
  0.0037  0.0030  0.0053  0.0031  0.224 
Note: All regression include period, sector and sector –time dummies. Values in brackets are (heteroskedasticity serial and spatial 
correlation robust) standard errors (see Driscoll and Kray, 1998) *, **, *** signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For 
France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, For the nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance 





Figure 2: Coefficients of interaction terms between years and distance to Brusells and 
year and distance to capital in total productivity growth regressions  
a) Years and distance to Brusells interaction –  16  – 
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Note: Figures displays coefficients of a regression as displayed in equation (1) but replacing Act*DBi variable 
with year * distance to capital as well as the Act*DCi variable with year * distance to brussels interaction 
dummy variables. 
Results  for  sectoral  productivity  growth  (see  table  4)  also  suggest  rather  mild 
implications of integration of on the regional structure of productivity. In particular 
coeffecients on the interaction of the dummy variable for accession and distance to 
Brussels are insignificant  for all cases and all  sectors analysed  – although they are 
positive  in  general  and  thus  have  the  oposite  sign  as  in  the  employment  growth 
regressions. Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction of the dummy for the period 
after accession and the distance to the capital city indicate significant deconcentration in 
the case of Greece and Northern Enlargement (i.e. those cases where no concentration 
was found in employment growth).  
Year and distance to Brusells interaction terms reconfirm this result. They are highly 
inrobust and provide little additional insights. Year and distance to capital interaction –  17  – 
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terms, however, show a clear pattern in the case of Northern Enlargement and Greece 
only (i.e. the cases where coefficients are significant in table 4). In these cases they start 
falling  (indicating  increased  productivity  growth  in  regions  further  away  from  the 
capital)  the  year  (Northern  Enlargment)  or  the  year  before  (Southern  Enlargement) 
integration and then settle at a lower level two years after integration. 
Results this far thus suggest that the link between regional employment growth and 
integration  has  been  substantially  weaker  in  the  EU  than  in  the  US-Mexico  case 
analysed in Hanson (1998). The evidence presented in tables 3 and 4, however, also 
suggests that geography played only a minor role in shaping employment growth prior 
to accession in any of the countries analysed. Both the coefficients on the distance to 
Brussels as well as the distance to the capital are insignificant in the majority of the 
cases. Interestingly, the coefficient on distance to Brussels is significantly positive and 
that on the distance to the capital city negative for all regressions for the case of Greece. 
Thus in Greece regions further from Brussels and closer to the capital cities showed 
higher employment growth in both manufacturing and services throughout the period 
analysed.  –  18  – 
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Greece  0.0100*** 
-
0.0055***  -0.0040***  0.0053***  -0.0381  156 
  0.0031  0.0003  0.0007  0.0005  0.0241  0.428 
Southern Enlargement  0.0014  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0020  300 
  0.0010  0.0000  0.0009  0.0002  0.0088  0.014 
Northern Enlargement   0.0024**  0.0003**  0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0177  276 
  0.0009  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0075  0.094 
             
France  0.0002  0.0004***  -0.0006***  -0.0003  0.0066  264 
  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0019  0.546 
North incumb  -0.0002  0.0000  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0036  276 
  0.0005  0.0004  0.0005  0.0005  0.0030  0.018 
Wage Growth 
Greece  -0.0083  0.0071  -0.0014  -0.0021***  0.2355  156 
  0.0022  0.0004  0.0029  0.0009  0.0162  0.157 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0112  0.0004  0.0020  0.0011  0.1614  300 
  0.0118  0.0010  0.0051  0.0016  0.1051  0.040 
Northern Enlargement   -0.0028  0.0011  0.0018  -0.0016***  0.0427  276 
  0.0032  0.0008  0.0028  0.0008  0.0186  0.045 
             
France  -0.0042**  0.0003  0.0003  -0.0023***  0.1024  264 
  0.0019  0.0007  0.0014  0.0009  0.0175  0.117 
North incumb  0.0013  0.0014***  0.0008  -0.0015  0.0296  276 
  0.0028  0.0004  0.0028  0.0011  0.0289  0.766 
Investment Rate 
Greece  -0.0133  0.0036  -0.0434***  0.0145***  -1.3800  165 
  0.0141  0.0031  0.0086  0.0030  0.0921  0.663 
Southern Enlargement  0.5131***  0.0333***  0.0289  -0.0117  -6.3579  300 
  0.0937  0.0056  0.0205  0.0126  0.7946  0.321 
Northern Enlargement  0.0095*  0.0010  0.0004  0.0016  -1.6841  276 
  0.0055  0.0036  0.0073  0.0034  0.0747  0.065 
             
France  -0.0116***  0.0026***  0.0097***  -0.0010  -1.5592  264 
  0.0034  0.0005  0.0045  0.0013  0.0178  0.427 
North incumb  -0.0090**  0.0043***  0.0140***  -0.0091***  -1.5586  276 
  0.0047  0.0021  0.0054  0.0025  0.0436  0.142 
Note: Values in brackets are (heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see 
Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is 
replaces  distance  to  Brussels,  For  the  nearby Member  States in  Northern  Enlargement  in  Italy  distance to 
Vienna, Denmark distance to Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country 
In Table 5 we focus on population growth - which we employ as proxy for migration 
flows - and regional wage growth as well as investment rates. Although these indicators 
are not available at a sectoral level, the results in general support the hypothesis of at 
most modest effects of integration on regional development in European integration. –  19  – 
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For wage growth we find no significant effects of integration on regions closer to the 
border and for population growth effects are insignificant (although negatively signed) 
in  all  countries  but  Greece  and  France.  This  suggests  that  some  migration  in  the 
direction  of  border  regions  occurred  after  integration  in  these  two  countries.  We, 
however, find that in both cases analysed regions nearer to the borders of newly joining 
countries in the nearby old member states experienced a decline in relative investment 
rates in both cases analysed. 
Enlargement also had a more important effect on the distribution of wages between 
centres and peripheral regions than on border regions. Wage growth in regions further 
away from the capital significantly increased in enlargement by Greece and Northern 
Enlargement as well as in France. Effects concerning other indicators, however, seem to 
be limited to indivual cases. We find increased concentration of population growth after 
Enlargement in Greece and deconcentration in investments but increased concentration 
in population growth for the nearby old member states in Northern Enlagrement. 
Finally,  in  contrast  to  the  employment  growth  regressions,  location  explains  a 
substantial part of the variance in population growth as well as for investment rates. In 
particular regions both nearer to the capital city and closer to Brussels had higher wage 
growth  already prior to  enlargement.  Furthermore,  in Southern Enlargement regions 
both closer to the capital and Brussels experienced higher investment rates. With respect 
to other indicators analysed there seems to be substantial heterogeneity in outcomes. In 
Southern  Enlargment  regions  both  closer  to  the  capital  and  Brussels  had  higher 
investment  rates  throughout,  while  in  France  regions  further  from  the  capital  city 
experienced higher population growth and regions both closer to Madrid and further –  20  – 
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from  the  national  capital  had  higher  investment  rates.  For  Northern  Enlargement 
population growth was significantly higher in regions far from the capital. 
Figure 3: Coefficients of interaction terms between years and distance to Brusells and 
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Note: Figure displays coefficients of a regression as displayed in equation (1) but replacing Act*DBi variable 
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Figure 4: Coefficients of interaction terms between years and distance to capital and 
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Note: Figure displays coefficients of a regression as displayed in equation (1) but replacing Act*DBi variable 
with year * distance to capital as well as the Act*DCi variable with year * distance to brussels interaction 
dummy variables. 
Comparing these results to the year by year development (see Figures 3 and 4) suggests 
that some of these effects can be attributed to enlargement. Relative investment rates 
started rising in regions further from the capital one year before enlargement and then 
increased over the complete estimation period in the nearby old member states. The 
evidence in Figure 3 also provides some additional insight in that similar patterns to the –  22  – 
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nearby old member states concerning investment rates can also be found in Southern 
Enlargement.  By  contrast  findings  on  the  cases  where  relative  population  growth 
increased in the border regions (i.e. enlargment by Greece and old member states in 
Northern  Enlargement),  suggest  a  much  less  clear  pattern  in  the  development  of 
coefficients.  
By  contrast,  results  on  the  development  of  the  interaction  of  year  dummies  with 
distance to the capital indicate that in cases where coeffecients are significant this effect 
may not be  due entirely to enlargment.  In particular in the case of wages  both the 
significant effects in enlargement by Greece and in the nearby old member states in 
Northern Enlargment are due to a more long rung increase in relative wage growth in 
regions further away from the border. Similar arguments apply to the development of 
investment rates of nearby old member states of Northern Enlargment. 
Results for total period 
In tables 6 to 8 we show results of specifications in which we lengthen the estimation 
period to the complete obeservation period available to us (i.e. to the time period 1975 – 
2000). As previously for employment growth (table 6) integration had prediominantly, 
insignificant effects on relative employment growth and productivity growth in regions 
closer  to  Brussels  and  a  significant  negative  effect  on  concentration  in  Southern 
Enlargement only. Also in the case of productivity growth regressions (see table 7) we 
find a similar pattern of significance as when analysing the shorter time period. The 
only  deviation  from  previous  results  is  that  in  France  a  marginally  significant 
deconcentration of service sector employment growth is found. –  23  – 
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Total Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0222***  -0.0036***  -0.0120  0.0018  4914 
  0.0034  0.0005  0.0274  0.0041  0.211 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0059  -0.0002  -0.0022  0.0022**  8750 
  0.0064  0.0005  0.0113  0.0013  0.204 
Northern Enlargement   0.0001  0.0002  -0.0027  -0.0001  8694 
  0.0022  0.0003  0.0031  0.0004  0.254 
           
France  0.0017  0.0011***  -0.0008  -0.0004  8316 
  0.0013  0.0003  0.0019  0.0007  0.456 
Italy  0.0003  0.0004  -0.0007  -0.0006  7560 
  0.0020  0.0008  0.0033  0.0009  0.206 
Denmark  -0.0107***  0.0005  0.0047  -0.0006  1134 
  0.0042  0.0005  0.0072  0.0006  0.879 
Manufacturing Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0229***  -0.0044***  -0.0093  0.0019  2808 
  0.0059  0.0008  0.0213  0.0035  0.229 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0106*  0.0001  -0.0030  0.0008  5000 
  0.0068  0.0003  0.0137  0.0011  0.189 
Notrhern Enlargement   0.0042***  -0.0004  -0.0008  0.0001  4968 
  0.0016  0.0004  0.0035  0.0006  0.252 
           
France  0.0009  0.0008  0.0005  0.0001  4752 
  0.0020  0.0005  0.0034  0.0012  0.352 
Italy  0.0002  0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0013  4860 
  0.0025  0.0010  0.0048  0.0011  0.161 
Denmark  -0.0145**  0.0004  0.0100  -0.0003  729 
  0.0058  0.0007  0.0104  0.0009  0.801 
Service Employment Growth 
Greece  0.0218***  -0.0030***  -0.0141  0.0017  2106 
  0.0042  0.0006  0.0335  0.0048  0.194 
Southern Enlargement  -0.0024  -0.0005  -0.0016  0.0033*  3750 
  0.0079  0.0008  0.0147  0.0025  0.170 
Notrhern Enlargement   -0.0030  0.0006  -0.0041  -0.0002  3726 
  0.0034  0.0006  0.0043  0.0008  0.239 
           
France  0.0027***  0.0014***  -0.0024**  -0.0010***  3564 
  0.0003  0.0002  0.0013  0.0003  0.586 
Italy  0.0010  0.0002  -0.0011  -0.0001  3240 
  0.0028  0.0009  0.0029  0.0010  0.281 
Denmark  -0.0058*  0.0001  0.0001  -0.0009*  486 
  0.0034  0.0004  0.0047  0.0006  0.897 
Note:  All  regression  include  period,  sector  and  sector  –time    dummies.  Values  in  brackets  are 
(heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** 
signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, 
For the  nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance to Vienna, Denmark distance to 
Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country –  24  – 
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  Total Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182  0.0122  0.0132  -0.0111  4914 
  0.0074  0.0028  0.0287  0.0054  0.339 
Southern Enlargement  0.0076  -0.0003  0.0023  -0.0017  8750 
  0.0126  0.0006  0.0150  0.0016  0.236 
Northern Enlargement   -0.0023  -0.0012  0.0075  -0.0004  8694 
  0.0047  0.0005  0.0051  0.0007  0.270 
           
France  -0.0026  0.0016  0.0010  -0.0018  8316 
  0.0093  0.0013  0.0096  0.0015  0.300 
Italy  -0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0023  -0.0002  7560 
  0.0021  0.0009  0.0037  0.0012  0.396 
  Manufacturing Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182  0.0084  0.0124  -0.0045  2106 
  0.0055  0.0020  0.0208  0.0043  0.431 
Southern Enlargement  0.0104  -0.0003  0.0003  -0.0007  3750 
  0.0076  0.0006  0.0126  0.0014  0.237 
Notrhern Enlargement (1995)  -0.0055  -0.0002  0.0051  -0.0006  3726 
  0.0050  0.0007  0.0060  0.0009  0.317 
           
France  -0.0058  0.0004  0.0040  0.0002  3564 
  0.0040  0.0004  0.0045  0.0008  0.566 
Italy  -0.0016  -0.0006  0.0004  -0.0001  3240 
  0.0029  0.0009  0.0033  0.0011  0.328 
  Service Productivity Growth 
Greece  -0.0182  0.0150  0.0139  -0.0161  2808 
  0.0108  0.0043  0.0369  0.0071  0.320 
Southern Enlargement  0.0056  -0.0004  0.0038  -0.0025  5000 
  0.0211  0.0011  0.0242  0.0029  0.234 
Northern Enlargement  0.0010  -0.0023  0.0035  0.0005  4968 
  0.0070  0.0008  0.0083  0.0011  0.195 
           
France  -0.0003  0.0025  -0.0012  -0.0034  4752 
  0.0135  0.0021  0.0142  0.0024  0.236 
Italy  -0.0004  0.0000  -0.0039  0.0004  4860 
  0.0027  0.0014  0.0050  0.0018  0.367 
Note:  All  regression  include  period,  sector  and  sector  –time    dummies.  Values  in  brackets  are 
(heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** 
signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, 
For the  nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance to Vienna, Denmark distance to 
Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country 
Results concerning wage growth, population growth and investment rate regressions, 
however, deviate somewhat from previous findings. In particular when lengthening the 
observation horizon to the complete time period, we find somewhat more significant 
effects of integration on the regions closer to Brussels concerning wage growth and 
investments. Regions closer to Brussels experienced significantly larger wage growth –  25  – 
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and investments after enlargement. (The coefficients are now significant or at least on 
the verge of significance in all cases but that of Northern Enlargment13 for wage growth 
and all nearby member states in the case of investment rates.) This suggests that wage 
and investment reactions in the face of accession may be more long run than covered by 
our original estimation period. 
For the previously old member states by contrast, our evidence suggests that the market 
access effect was weaker than the market crowding effect. We find significant increases 
in investment rates in regions further away from the border in all cases for the newly 
joining countries. 
At the same time focusing on the more long run developments reconfirms the finding 
that integration aside from having long run effects on regions closer to the border also 
led to some effects on concentration and deconcentration. In general these effects are 
found for the same cases as when focusing on short run developments. The exception to 
this, however, investment rates in Southern and Northern enlargement.  
                                                       
13 This may however be attributed to the fact that in this accession we have a very short observation 
horizon after integration. –  26  – 
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  Population Growth 
Greece  0.00495*  -0.00513***  -0.00485***  0.00600***  0.00129  351 
  0.00289  0.00025  0.00062  0.00046  0.02240  0.109 
Southern Enlargement  0.00049  -0.00025**  -0.00031  0.00015  0.00462  625 
  0.00096  0.00012  0.00043  0.00017  0.00812  0.038 
Notrhern Enlargement   0.00221***  0.00009  0.00001  -0.00022*  -0.0151***  621 
  0.00057  0.00012  0.00013  0.00015  0.00499  0.034 
             
France  0.00020  0.00026***  -0.00007  -0.00002  0.00172  594 
  0.00024  0.00005  0.00012  0.00007  0.00250  0.009 
Italy  -0.00031  0.00023***  -0.00017  -0.00040***  0.00528***  540 
  0.00018  0.00008  0.00027  0.00009  0.00187  0.155 
  Wage Growth 
Greece  -0.00178  0.00664***  -0.00882**  -0.00049  0.18492  351 
  0.01090  0.00091  0.00353  0.00240  0.08410  0.128 
Southern Enlargement  -0.00206  0.00063  -0.00335**  -0.00030  0.09259*  625 
  0.00679  0.00087  0.00173  0.00120  0.06085  0.052 
Northern Enlargement   -0.00148  0.00022  -0.00213*  -0.00084*  0.06584***  621 
  0.00240  0.00040  0.00158  0.00048  0.01882  0.051 
             
France  -0.00173  0.00112  -0.00472***  -0.00345**  0.11952***  594 
  0.00297  0.00063  0.00084  0.00114  0.03007  0.414 
Italy  0.00044  0.00040  -0.00253  -0.00021  0.06284**  540 
  0.00187  0.00106  0.00322  0.00118  0.02671  0.029 
  Investment Rate 
Greece  0.01003  0.00183  -0.02821***  0.00522*  -1.5607***  531 
  0.01267  0.00293  0.00925  0.00370  0.08017  0.365 
Southern Enlargement  0.23141**  0.03995***  -0.05998***  -0.03851***  -3.9573***  621 
  0.12761  0.00653  0.01835  0.01282  1.06441  0.036 
Northern Enlargement  -0.02554**  -0.00429**  -0.00631*  0.00513**  -1.3142***  621 
  0.01309  0.00274  0.00475  0.00271  0.11686  0.009 
             
France  0.00014  0.00093**  -0.00227  0.00031  -1.5761***  594 
  0.00174  0.00047  0.00279  0.00079  0.01833  0.017 
Italy  0.00134  0.00107***  -0.00243  -0.00139**  -1.5586***  540 
  0.00137  0.00034  0.00367  0.00046  0.01981  0.067 
Note: Values in brackets are (heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see 
Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is 
replaces  distance  to  Brussels,  For  the  nearby Member  States in  Northern  Enlargement  in  Italy  distance to 
Vienna, Denmark distance to Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country 
Conclusions 
This  paper  analyses  the  regional  effects  of  previous  enlargements  of  the  European 
Union for three cases of enlargement. We argue that there are a number of reasons to 
expect these effects to differ from cases analysed in previous literature. We find that the –  27  – 
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effects of enlargements on regional employment wage, and population growth, as well 
as investments have been small. In particular focusing on regional development seven 
years after integration, we find very few significant effects and substantial heterogeneity 
among individual cases analysed which leads us to conclude regional integration effects 
do not materialise automatically. 
We also find some evidence that effects on regional wage levels and investment rates 
are stronger than on employment, productivity and wage growth at least in the long run. 
This suggests that in the low internal migration context of European integration wage 
effects are more likely to materialise than employment and productivity growth effects. 
Finally, we find some differences in results concerning long-term developments and the 
7  year  post accession period. Focusing on the complete observation period we find 
stronger evidence of increased wage growth in border regions after accession, which 
concentrate mainly on the newly joining member states and, our results weakly support 
the view that in newly acceding countries regions closer to the border of the EU may 
expect higher investments and higher wage growth in the long run. In the old member 
states by contrast integration of new member states has weaker effects. 
From these results we would argue that the likely effects of integration of the Central 
and Eastern European Countries into the European Union on the spatial structure of 
employment  may  be  less  strong  than  often  argued.  While  border  regions  in  the 
candidate countries may expect modestly higher increases in investments and wages 
than inland regions in the long run, the regional structure of existing member states 
should remain largely unaffected both in the short and the long run.  –  28  – 
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Appendix: Robustness of Results 
Table A1 : Regression Results for Sectoral Employment Growth 




disca_1  Nobs (r2) 
Greece  0.7767  -0.3877***  0.0217  -0.0044***  -0.0067  0.0013  2184 
  0.8009  0.1025  0.0034  0.0007  0.0063  0.0014  0.610 
Southern Enlargement  0.2364  0.2576  -0.0015  -0.0004  -0.0192  0.0024**  4200 
  2.5487  0.1956  0.0076  0.0005  0.0204  0.0012  0.144 
Northern Enlargement   -2.7501  0.3278  0.0011  0.0006  -0.0044  -0.0007  3862 
  5.8513  0.2728  0.0064  0.0009  0.0072  0.0008  0.243 
               
France  9.7027  -0.0718  0.0021  0.0008  0.0025  -0.0003  3696 
  3.7561  0.1343  0.0015  0.0009  0.0040  0.0012  0.362 
North inc  -0.0196  -0.0004  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  3864 
  0.0004  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.151 
Manuf Prod               
Greece  -7.0190  -1.7188***  0.0195  -0.0030***  0.0058  -0.0016  936 
  0.5573  0.3047  0.0056  0.0007  0.0060  0.0008  0.667 
Southern Enlargement  4.6852  0.3027  -0.0010  -0.0001  -0.0226  0.0024  1800 
  2.8818  0.7079  0.0086  0.0009  0.0236  0.0020  0.203 
Notrhern Enlargement (  -8.1916  0.2587  0.0091  -0.0007  -0.0068  0.0001  1656 
  5.2370  0.2241  0.0015  0.0012  0.0035  0.0013  0.247 
               
France  8.9286  0.1056  0.0016  0.0023  0.0021  -0.0012  1584 
  3.8025  0.1493  0.0009  0.0006  0.0036  0.0003  0.528 
North inc  -3.6613  0.0034  0.0029  0.0003  -0.0026  -0.0005  1656 
  2.4974  0.0679  0.0037  0.0009  0.0038  0.0010  0.295 
Service Prod               
Greece  6.3574  -0.2203***  0.0230  -0.0060***  -0.0132  0.0025  1248 
  1.2275  0.1014  0.0044  0.0010  0.0103  0.0023  0.621 
Southern Enlargement  -3.2501  0.2048*  -0.0017  -0.0006  -0.0167  0.0023  2400 
  4.2705  0.1457  0.0124  0.0009  0.0270  0.0012  0.110 
Notrhern Enlargement   3.1381  0.5555  -0.0053  0.0016  -0.0021  -0.0014  2208 
  11.4349  0.5637  0.0106  0.0021  0.0114  0.0017  0.208 
               
France  9.3989  -0.0865  0.0027  0.0006  0.0023  -0.0008  2112 
  7.7380  0.1236  0.0033  0.0017  0.0077  0.0022  0.2824 
Italy  -0.6951  0.1164  0.0008  -0.0007  -0.0011  0.0006  2484 
  2.7334  0.1756  0.0028  0.0006  0.0047  0.0007  0.1415 
Note:  All  regression  include  period,  sector  and  sector  –time    dummies.  Values  in  brackets  are 
(heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** 
signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, 
For the  nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance to Vienna, Denmark distance to 
Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country 
While  the  results  in  the  main  paper  are  suggestive,  a  number  of  methodological 
criticisms could be levelled against them. In particular one could argue that measuring 
all effects on the regional distribution of employment, population and wage growth as 
well  on  investments  through  dummy  variables  may  lead  to  ommitted  variables –  33  – 
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problems. For this reason Hanson 1998 suggests using a series of further proxies for the 
influences  of  regional  employment.  These  include  the  share  of  employment  of  a 
particular industry in a region and the gini coefficient in a region (see tables 9 and 10).  
Table A2: Regression Results for Sectoral Productivity Growth 
Total Prod  ginireg  rconcentr  distock  discap  _ImemXdisto_1 
_ImemX 
disca_1  Nobs (r2) 
Greece  1.4699  0.5145***  -0.0167  0.0122  0.0113  -0.0073**  2184 
  2.8045  0.1792  0.0079  0.0034  0.0132  0.0036  0.484 
Southern Enlargement  -2.1821  -0.2643  0.0087  0.0002  0.0112  -0.0018  4200 
  4.0885  0.3034  0.0229  0.0007  0.0257  0.0025  0.236 
Northern Enlargement   -1.7872  -0.1362  -0.0037  -0.0002  0.0090*  -0.0015**  3862 
  4.8786  0.2414  0.0063  0.0005  0.0065  0.0007  0.202 
               
France  3.1498  -0.0159  -0.0054  -0.0003  0.0068  0.0008  3696 
  7.7872  0.2600  0.0066  0.0011  0.0081  0.0018  0.362 
North inc  5.9879  -0.2222  -0.0031  0.0007  0.0003  -0.0012  3864 
  3.2710  0.1726  0.0015  0.0015  0.0029  0.0016  0.151 
Manuf Prod              0.2469 
Greece  5.9984  1.2876***  -0.0155  0.0070  -0.0028  0.0014  936 
  2.3153  0.3379  0.0054  0.0020  0.0070  0.0034  0.695 
Southern Enlargement  -2.6087  -0.3332  0.0082  -0.0002  0.0077  -0.0023  1800 
  3.3674  0.5110  0.0083  0.0011  0.0232  0.0027  0.188 
Notrhern Enlargement  -2.1967  0.1158  -0.0062  0.0010  0.0053  -0.0019  1656 
  7.2139  0.3160  0.0048  0.0016  0.0053  0.0015  0.133 
               
France  -2.0922  -0.0056  0.0008  0.0008  -0.0028  -0.0004  1584 
  5.3029  0.2667  0.0029  0.0011  0.0058  0.0023  0.459 
North inc  3.1874  -0.2844  -0.0024  0.0004  0.0012  -0.0009  1656 
  2.1436  0.2345  0.0034  0.0007  0.0036  0.0009  0.323 
Service Prod               
Greece  -1.7501  0.4237***  -0.0173  0.0164  0.0203  -0.0132  1248 
  3.8562  0.1994  0.0117  0.0053  0.0230  0.0048  0.442 
Southern Enlargement  -1.8610  -0.2624  0.0092  0.0004  0.0137  -0.0015  2400 
  6.0505  0.3011  0.0393  0.0013  0.0399  0.0028  0.232 
Notrhern Enlargement   -4.2328  -0.4848  -0.0015  -0.0011  0.0109  -0.0010  2208 
  7.9298  0.3282  0.0085  0.0013  0.0089  0.0014  0.117 
               
France  2.2504  0.0143  -0.0102  -0.0012  0.0126  0.0016  2112 
  14.3049  0.2198  0.0154  0.0024  0.0173  0.0026  0.1492 
Italy  8.7998  -0.0899  -0.0022  0.0007  -0.0018  -0.0009  2484 
  3.6700  0.3767  0.0038  0.0031  0.0053  0.0031  0.2267 
Note:  All  regression  include  period,  sector  and  sector  –time    dummies.  Values  in  brackets  are 
(heteroskedasticity serial and spatial correlation robust) standard errors  (see Driscoll and Kray (1998) *, **, *** 
signify significance at the 10% (5%) (1%) level. For France distance to Madrid is replaces distance to Brussels, 
For the  nearby Member States in Northern Enlargement in Italy distance to Vienna, Denmark distance to 
Stockholm is used as the distance to the nearest capital of a joining country 
In  general  the  results  change  very  little  about  the  general  findings.  The  effect  of 
integration on regions more diistant from Brussels remain insignificant for both the –  34  – 
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employment growth as well as the productivity growth regression and a concentration 
of  production  can  be  found  only  in  the  case  of  employment  growth  in  southern 
enlargement while in the case of Northern Enlargement and enlargement by Greece 
regions further away from the capital city showed higher productivity growth.  
The  results  provide  additional  insights  in  so  far  as  they  suggest  that  both  regional 
concentration  and  specialisation  as  measured  through  the  gini  coefficient  and  the 
regional  concentration  remained  insignificant  determinants  of  regional  growth 
experiences in most countries analysed. We find that only increased regions in which an 
industry was more concentrated showed significantly higher productivity growth but 
lower employment growth. 